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This Article applies network effect theory to transnational commercial law, arguing that 
commercial parties selecting law through choice of law and choice of forum clauses can be likened 
to consumers selecting a product, and thus equally susceptible to the effects of network 
externalities.  The number of “consumers” who subscribe to the same legal norms is analogous to 
the number of consumers who use a product.  As the number of “consumers” increases, so too does 
the inherent value of selecting that jurisdiction, inducing even more parties to “purchase” that body 
of law.  This is a network effect.  I argue that transnational commercial law is ideally calibrated so 
as to generate a network effect.  This stems from the inherent nature of commerce.  The discussion 
distinguishes between two kinds of externalities, direct and indirect network externalities, 
concluding that network systems that possess both kinds of network externalities (as is the case 
with law-selection decisions in commercial contracts), are the best candidates to produce a robust 
network effect.  I then examine how the twin ingredients of fluid interaction and frequent choice 
present in commerce precipitate a network effect.  Expansive interaction places a higher premium 
on the need for synchronization, and frequent opportunities to select law in the contracts of fresh 
commercial relationships allow for an incremental drift toward a specific jurisdiction.  The Article 
ultimately concludes that, as a result, network externalities play an influential role in the ascension 
of particular jurisdictions over others in law-selection decisions—an important conclusion because 
it points to an unrecognized influence underpinning the current development of transnational 
commercial law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 As commercial relations reach across the threshold of national 
jurisdictions, the obstruction of conflicting laws and regulations becomes 
increasingly problematic.  As one justice opined, there is “a jungle of 
separate, broadly based, jurisdictions all over the world.”1  In having to 
deal with this plethora of jurisdictions, choice of law issues inevitably 
arise.  In response to this problem, commercial actors2 typically tackle the 
                                                 
 1. Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, [1999] 1 A.C. 119, 132 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 2. For the purposes of this discussion, commercial actors, and the term “commercial 
law” specifically, concerns the private law circumstances that involve business and commercial 
transactions between two or more parties.  The focus here is commercial relationships of a 
transnational character.  This definition embraces the actual terms of the contracts these parties 
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challenge of concurrent jurisdiction head-on by preemptively agreeing 
upon a particular jurisdiction in advance.  “[P]arties to international 
contracts often include contractual dispute resolution provisions in their 
agreements.”3  These provisions usually take two forms:  forum selection 
clauses or arbitration agreements, both of which are typically followed by 
a choice of law clause selecting the substantive law that will apply in the 
case of a dispute.4  The reasons for this selection of a particular body of 
law are many, ranging from merely procedural to substantive issues of 
law.5  To be sure, one or more of these issues will factor into these 
considerations, influencing parties’ decisions as to jurisdiction.6  While 
this is no doubt the case, the discussion which follows will look at the 
idea that there is, however, an underlying path-dependent process at work 
which plays a major contributing role in both choice of forum and choice 
of law decisions.  Although distinct from one another, for the purposes of 
this Article, when we speak more broadly of “law-selection decisions,” 
                                                                                                                  
formulate or choose to adopt, together with any default rules or mandatory provisions related to 
the parties’ transactions that come into play for any issues not settled by the parties themselves, as 
well as any enforcement mechanisms the parties can use when things go wrong.  Still, a far more 
precise description is offered by Dalhuisen.  See JAN H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON 
TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAW 2-3 (Hart 
Publishing 2007) (2001) (“In common law countries commercial law is traditionally associated 
with the sale and transportation of goods . . . and with the related shipping, insurance and 
payment methods and therefore traditionally with the contract for the sale of goods and with 
specialised modern trade terms like Fob and Cif, bills of lading, bills of exchange, promissory 
notes and other methods of payment.  Commercial law covers the entire area, that is to say the 
contractual as well as proprietary aspects of the trade in goods . . . therefore also the transfer of 
ownership and any secured interests in these assets, e.g. to protect payment or raise finance, and 
the protection of bona fide purchasers. . . .  In civil law terms the coverage of commercial law is 
traditionally different, being much broader on the one hand and narrower on the other.  It is 
broader in that it is not unusual, for example, to find company law and insolvency law and much 
of financial law covered by it, and therefore also services . . . .  But it is also narrower, as this 
coverage is only partial, and major topics in the commercial law area may remain covered by the 
general law or legal system, as mentioned above.  This concerns particularly the proprietary 
aspects (like transfer of ownership in goods and investments and the creation of any security 
interests therein even if connected with the sale of goods), and their operation in a bankruptcy, 
and brings with it the civil law restriction to only a small number of internally closely connected 
property rights.  But it also concerns the general notions of contract law and of partnerships 
which in the commercial law area are in civil law equally derived from the general private law 
system.”). 
 3. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS 2 
(1999). 
 4. Id. at 2-3. 
 5. Id. at 1. 
 6. Throughout the discussion, the term “jurisdiction” is used to indicate both forum and 
a particular body of law. 
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this should be understood as inclusive of both choice of forum and 
choice of law.7 
 I will suggest that similar to the emergence of natural monopolies of 
certain products in the market through the workings of a network effect, 
the common selection of certain jurisdictions such as the United 
Kingdom and New York State in choice of forum and choice of law 
provisions may likewise be attributed, in some measure, to network 
externalities.8  In this sense, commercial parties selecting law can be 
likened to consumers selecting a product, and are thus equally 
susceptible to the effects of network externalities.  They are, in effect, 
                                                 
 7. It is, of course, important to note that choice of law clauses and forum selection 
clauses are wholly distinct; while the former stipulates the use of a particular jurisdiction’s law, 
the latter specifies the actual forum in which the legal proceedings will be held.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines a choice of law clause as “[a] contractual provision by which the parties 
designate the jurisdiction whose law will govern any disputes that may arise between the parties.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 2004).  A forum-selection clause rather is defined as “[a] 
contractual provision in which parties establish the place (such as the country, state, or type of 
court) for specified litigation between them.”  Id. at 681.  Thus, the parties may choose as a forum 
the courts of Greece, but may agree that the applicable law should be English law.  The present 
discussion, however, seeks to examine the prevalence of certain jurisdictions in both choice of law 
and choice of forum clauses.  We are exploring the presence of network externalities in both 
cases.  Both are susceptible to the influence of a network effect.  Thus, most of what we say about, 
for instance, choice of forum decisions applies equally to choice of law determinations, as both 
are subject to the influence of network externalities and for the same reasons.  We are concerned 
with situations where the choice of forum and the jurisdiction indicated by the choice of law 
provision are one and the same, which, in the vast majority of cases, it is.  However, in cases 
where a specific forum is selected by the contracting parties while a choice of law clause 
stipulates another body of law, although choice of law provisions point more directly to actual 
substantive matters of law, many aspects of the forum choice seen in the light of the present 
subject-of-law selection and network externalities may be conceptualized as procedural, or 
perhaps logistical issues of law, because the choice of forum will invariably affect the practical 
course of the legal dispute. 
 The distinction, however, becomes important when we go on to examine some of the factors 
typically cited as influencing choice of forum decisions, as we do in the first half of the Article.  
This is because here we identify the measure of expertise and general competence (among several 
other factors) that an actual court may glean from having a large number of cases brought before 
it as a network externality.  Obviously, in situations where a specific body of law is selected while 
the actual case is tried in a completely separate venue, that body of law’s courts will not, as a 
consequence, be in a position to further hone their expertise.  Thus, this situation would not 
contribute towards a network effect per se.  However, even when a certain jurisdiction’s law is 
invoked through a choice of law clause but the actual court proceedings are held in a different 
venue, some of the “support system” that benefits from increased usage, such as legal expertise 
as embodied in precedent, will nevertheless still function as network externalities, if these 
decisions themselves in turn supplement the case law.  For a fuller explanation, see supra Part II.E 
(“Motivations for Forum Selection Other Than Network Effect Are in Fact Network 
Externalities”). 
 8. The actual extent to which network externalities help shape choice of venue and 
choice of law determinations, and indeed a great many other aspects of commercial interaction, is 
a matter for further empirical investigation.  The aim of this Article is merely to lay out the idea in 
its broad strokes. 
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“consuming” a legal jurisdiction.  The number of “consumers” who 
subscribe to the same legal norms is analogous to the number of 
consumers who use a product.  As the number of “consumers” increases, 
so too does the inherent value of selecting that jurisdiction, thus inducing 
even more people to “purchase” that body of law (a network effect).9  The 
end result is that a network effect comparable to what is often witnessed 
with consumer products is discernable in law-selection decisions in 
transnational contracts, inducing the emergence of certain jurisdictions as 
standard selections recognized throughout the world as, in the language 
of economics, a “natural monopoly.”10  Arguably, the very same path-
dependent process that precipitated the use of, for instance, VHS 
recorders has contributed to the widespread designation of English 
commercial law in transnational contracts.  As network effects often arise 
within commercial networks, they may likewise emerge from the law 
constructed around commerce. 
 There is fascinating literature on network effects and the law.11  Yet, 
the application of network theory on legal processes has not yet been 
fully developed, nor the full extent of its implications properly assessed.  
Some of the more prominent examinations of the idea include Kahan and 
Klausner, Gillette, and Lemley and McGowan, with Klausner perhaps 
being the most commonly cited in reference to network effect and law.12  
Kahan and Klausner (and Klausner alone) examine increasing returns in 
corporate contract terms, arguing that network externalities can induce 
standardization in firm contracts.13  Building somewhat on their findings, 
                                                 
 9. A simple definition of a network effect is:  “Network effects arise where current users 
of a good gain when additional users adopt it.”  Paul Klemperer, Network Goods (Theory), in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW {pinpoint?} (Steven Dunlauf & 
Lawrence Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (1987).  See supra Part II.B (“So What Exactly Is a Network 
Effect?”) for a fuller explanation. 
 10. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
210-12 (3d ed. London:  Prentice-Hall Int’l 1990) (1979). 
 11. The topic has been treated in various aspects by several authors.  See Marcel Kahan 
& Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:  Increasing Returns, Herd 
Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 348 (1996); Avery Katz, Standard Form 
Contracts, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 
503. 
 12. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 11, at 350; Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 759 (1995); Clayton P. Gillette, 
Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 814-15 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488 
(1998). 
 13. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 11, at 351; see also Klausner, supra note 12, at 
759.  Here Klausner argues that the contractarian view that the value of a corporate contract term 
is unrelated to the number of firms that adopt it is not true because the value of a term often 
increases in relation to the network of users that employ it.  Thus, Klausner concludes that 
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Gillette also looks at the idea of network externalities, and more 
specifically at the related notion of lock-in, in an effort to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of adjudication versus legislation as well as 
regulation through norm formulation.14  Lemley and McGowan also 
provide important insight on exactly how network effects should be 
treated in the law with a view to correctly integrate network theory into 
legal doctrine.15 
 This Article, however, will step beyond these ideas and suggest that 
commercial law as a whole, particularly its transnational variety where a 
clear central authority is absent, is uniquely susceptible to the effects of 
network externalities in aspects that go far beyond a mere interde-
pendence between contract terms, as Klausner suggests,16 or the potential 
hazards of lock-in, as is the case with Gillette.17  The central contention of 
this Article is that transnational commercial law, for reasons directly 
related to the basic nature of trade, is, more so than its noncommercial 
counterpart, ideally calibrated so as to induce a network effect.  There are 
two central reasons I make this claim of heightened susceptibility.  First, 
commercial activity entails a relatively fluid shifting of partnerships, 
animated by a powerful incentive to form new relationships between 
actors.  Second, the unique ability of these actors to formulate through 
contract terms, and/or to simply choose the law that will oversee their 
relationships, allows for the emergence of standardization through the 
corralling process of a network effect.  As we will see, these two 
elements of interaction between actors (or at least potential interaction), 
as well as choice, are the key ingredients for the emergence of a network 
effect.  Both elements are manifestly present in commercial relationships.  
The element of choice in particular sets commercial law apart from other 
forms of law.  While there may be a certain intermingling of actors 
within noncommercial variants of law, say criminal law for example, the 
ability of parties to select (or to some degree formulate) the relevant law 
themselves is simply not present as it is in commercial dealings.  My 
basic task then is to explain how these twin ingredients of commercial 
law, fluid interaction and choice, together with two different kinds of 
network externalities, can induce the emergence of a powerful network 
effect.  The main thrust of the discussion lies here. 
                                                                                                                  
“market forces cannot be relied upon to promote socially optimal corporate contracts.”  Klausner, 
supra note 12, at 759. 
 14. See Gillette, supra note 12, at 814. 
 15. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 609. 
 16. See Klausner, supra note 12, at 762. 
 17. See Gillette, supra note 12, at 814. 
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 To be sure, merchants sometimes give only modest consideration to 
law-selection decisions when entering into commercial relationships, 
falling back instead on what is commonly done or, alternatively, opting 
for some “neutral” forum without giving the matter much thought.18  As a 
consequence of this inattention, these same parties are perhaps even 
more susceptible to a network effect, because they will typically opt for 
the jurisdiction that is already the prevailing standard in “boiler plate” 
clauses in their commercial sector.  More sophisticated commercial 
actors, however, (or merchants who simply engage frequently in 
transnational contracts) can hardly afford such a lackadaisical approach.  
In fact, merchants that regularly operate in a transnational setting must 
prudently consider the legal consequences of law-selection decisions; to 
not do so would be to undertake a considerable financial risk.  Indeed, 
responsible legal counsel for large transnational commercial operators 
will certainly make clear to their clients the potential significance of their 
law-selection decisions.19  For these actors, the benefits generated by 
network externalities may emerge as an important factor in their law-
selection decisions.20  Thus, we have an interesting situation involving 
two tiers of actors:  parties who, because they are more finely attuned to 
network benefits, tend to gravitate to a certain jurisdiction or body of law, 
and commercial actors who typically pay less attention to law-selection 
decisions but nevertheless succumb to the identical pattern precisely 
because they are less attentive.  The end result in both cases is the same:  
a network effect emerges.  
  Arguably, the spread of legal standards, business usages, standard 
terms of contract, rules of arbitration, centers of arbitration, and even 
                                                 
 18. See Henry D. Gabriel, DeVan Daggett Professor of Law, Loyola Univ. (New Orleans), 
Address at the Congress To Celebrate the Fortieth Annual Session of UNCITRAL:  Choice of 
Law, Contract Terms and Uniform Law in Practice (July 12, 2007) (“[T]here is strong evidence to 
suggest that choice of law clauses are often put in agreements with no particular thought of the 
effect or outcome of the provisions.  Thus, for example, it is not uncommon for the parties to 
provide for the law of a specific domestic jurisdiction only to discover later in litigation that their 
agreement is bound by the CISG because, unknown to the parties, that was the applicable 
domestic law by treaty.”). 
 19. Another possible way of explaining, for instance, the prevalence of English law in 
choice of law decisions may be to point to historical reasons involving the effects of British 
military colonialism.  This may very well be true, and the present discussion need not reject this 
reasoning out of hand.  Historical events may have, to some extent, determined the initial 
trajectory of certain legal regimes.  However, the path-dependent dynamic latent in commercial 
interaction more or less insured that once this legal trajectory was set, the tendency to gravitate to 
this one body of law would become more deeply entrenched over time, propelled by an 
underlying network effect. 
 20. In fact, this is particularly true for commercial entities selecting a forum for 
arbitration, where so much is pinned to the specific arbitration tribunal. 
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entire legal systems—in short, all the elements of the modern law 
merchant—may be attributed to the effects of network externalities.21  A 
case could be made that increasing returns underlie the development of 
the modern law merchant, as was equally true for its medieval 
forerunner.22 This is a compelling topic that indeed invites further study.
23    However, for the purposes of this short Article, our theoretical
focus will be confined to that of the issues of choice of law and forum 
selection, because this topic offers a clear illustration of how parties 
define the law that applies to their immediate dealings, in this case 
through an outright selection of an entire body of law.  Network theory 
may go far in explaining why international parties gravitate to certain 
jurisdictions over others.  In this sense, a law-selection decision offers 
itself up as a concise snapshot of the potential impact of network 
externalities on commercial law.  It should be firmly borne in mind, 
however, that the reach of the idea extends far beyond the outer edges of 
this one specific example, which points to a much larger path-dependent 
pattern discernable within the growth of transnational commercial 
dealings. 
 At this point it might also be useful to clarify what else is left out of 
the discussion.  The related issue of lock-in induced inefficiency and the 
potential generation of sub-optimal equilibria, though an interesting and 
                                                 
 
 21. This idea forms a core component of my present Ph.D. dissertation. 
 22. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.  For a fascinating, succinct treatment of 
spontaneous law theory as applied to the medieval Law Merchant, see B.L. Benson, The 
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989).  For a more general study 
of the Law Merchant of the middle ages, see LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT:  THE 
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983). 
      23.   The concept of norm cascades has been put forward by many norms scholars as an 
explanation of norm change, who have themselves borrowed the idea from game theorists, 
evolutionary biologists, and economists of information. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution 
of Social Norms:  A Perspective from the Legal Academy 3 (Yale Law Sch., Program for Studies 
in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 230, 1999); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law 
and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585-86 (1998); Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and 
Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 628 (1998); Richard 
H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 358-60 
(1997); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 646-47 
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909, 967 
(1996). 
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no doubt pertinent consideration, is not addressed, because this too lies 
slightly outside the scope of the present discussion.24  Carbonara and 
Parisi provide some inquiry along these lines.25  They offer an interesting 
game theoretic analysis of divergent choice of law regimes and consider 
their impact on the evolution of formal law and commercial practices, 
concluding rather counterintuitively that less restrictive choice of law 
regimes26 may in fact allow countries to actually maintain inefficient 
rules, with private firms opting out of domestic law through choice of 
law provisions.  It should be noted that their emphasis is to examine the 
process of convergence of state substantive law in the presence of legal 
competition through choice of law, rather than network-induced 
inefficiencies per se.  Carbonara and Parisi look at network effect and 
choice of law only in terms of how such situations ultimately affect the 
efficiency of national laws.  For our purposes, issues of legal efficiency 
or inefficiency are left entirely out of the picture.  Rather, our focus here 
is on deconstructing the key constituents of commercial interaction that 
precipitate a network effect in the first place, and how these components 
tend to coalesce in law-selection situations.  This Article extends the 
literature on network externalities and law by providing such a systematic 
examination. 
 The discussion is laid out in two parts.  The first Part discusses 
some of the standard reasons to which choice of forum decisions are 
attributed, which by and large affect choice of law decisions as well, and 
deals generally with the basic notion of network effect, along with its 
past treatment in the network effect in law literature.  I begin with an 
overview of the various reasons for forum choice other than network 
externalities.  After then clarifying the nature of a network effect, I map 
out a model of direct and indirect network externalities.  I then revisit the 
reasons usually cited for choice of forum and choice of law decisions, 
concluding that the majority of these factors are indirect network 
externalities.  The basic conclusion of this section is that systems that 
exhibit both direct and indirect network externalities are most apt to 
produce a network effect. 
                                                 
 24. The hazards of inefficiency have been the focus of much of the literature discussing 
law and network effect, and much of the network effect literature in general.  See Emanuela 
Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Choice of Law and Legal Evolution:  Rethinking the Market for 
Legal Rules 2 (Minn. Legal Studies, Paper No. 07-38, 2007); Klausner, supra note 12, at 765. 
 25. See Carbonara & Parisi, supra note 24, at 2. 
 26. Less restrictive in the sense that these jurisdictions allow firms to opt out of domestic 
law via choice of law provisions.  Carbonara and Parisi define three general types here:  
(1) restrictive regimes, (2) semi-restrictive, and (3) liberal regimes.  Id. at 5. 
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 The second Part of the discussion traces the effects of network 
externalities specifically on commercial law, supporting my main claim 
that commercial law is particularly inclined to produce a network effect.  
I examine the elements of interaction and choice inherent in commercial 
interaction, concluding that network externalities play an influential role 
in the ascension of particular jurisdictions over others in law-selection 
decisions.  This important conclusion points to a heretofore unrecognized 
influence underpinning the development of transnational commercial law 
as a whole. 
 The idea of network externalities sheds much light on the predomi-
nance of certain jurisdictions over others, as well as a great many other 
aspects of commercial law.  The discussion that follows will briefly lay 
out the bare bones of the idea, though the topic is deserving of a far more 
in-depth, intricate, and empirical discussion than can be presented here. 
II. LAW SELECTION AND NETWORK EFFECTS UNPACKED 
A. Reasons for Forum Choice Other than Network Externalities 
 On the face of it, it seems that there are other factors besides 
network externalities influencing forum selection and choice of law 
decisions.  Indeed, there are a great many reasons for selecting a specific 
body of law and selecting one venue over another.27  Such distinctions 
regarding jurisdiction have fueled the rise of the phenomenon of “forum 
shopping,” a term used to describe litigants actively seeking some form 
of advantage through lawsuit venue.28  In recent decades forum shopping 
has only accelerated in pace with the swift advance of economic 
globalization.29  “In a world where daily transactions routinely involve 
multiple countries, litigants are increasingly likely to find themselves 
embroiled in simultaneous contests in several theaters.”30  In such a 
setting, it is not uncommon for a litigant to “attempt ‘to have his action 
tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the 
most favorable judgment or verdict.’”31  Forum shopping, however, is not 
                                                 
 27. See ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 
24 (2003). 
 28. WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 12 n.21 (1995).  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “forum shopping” as “[t]he practice of choosing the most favorable 
jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, 
at 681. 
 29. BELL, supra note 27, at 4-5. 
 30. L.E. Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple:  A Proposal To Resolve Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT’L L. 21, 22 (1992). 
 31. Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1990) (citing 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 590 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “forum shopping”)). 
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what we are chiefly concerned with here.  Choice of forum clauses and 
arbitration agreements differ from forum shopping, “principally because 
the forum is in theory selected mutually by both parties.  In most cases, a 
freely accepted prorogation agreement may mean no more than an 
attempt to find relatively neutral procedures and fair judges.”32  Parties 
frequently make express provisions in their contractual arrangements for 
litigation or arbitration in a neutral venue, such as London, that is 
acceptable to all of the parties to the agreement.33  In MacShannon v. 
Rockware Glass Ltd., Lord Salmon notes that “[h]undreds if not 
thousands of commercial contracts, having nothing to do with the United 
Kingdom, are made all over the world every year between foreigners, 
containing a clause that . . . any difference or dispute between the parties 
shall be arbitrated in London.”34  Some estimates contend that 
in about 80 per cent of cases in the [English] Commercial Court at least 
one of the parties is not resident in the United Kingdom, and that in about 
50 percent of cases all parties are foreign . . . .  [I]n many cases, parties to a 
transnational dispute are perfectly content to litigate in England (or other 
large commercial centres such as New York or Sydney).35 
 Even in situations, however, where parties have decided in advance, 
through mutual consent, on a specific forum, there are a host of 
exogenous factors that may influence their decision.  For instance, “[t]he 
reasons [that] lead foreigners to start proceedings in England are very 
complex.  They may include some particular substantive or procedural 
advantage.  More often, they are based on general considerations of cost, 
convenience and confidence in the system.”36  Let us now look at some of 
these underlying considerations in greater detail, bearing in mind that 
most of them apply equally to choice of law decisions. 
1. Unfamiliar and Not Competent 
 Chief among these considerations is the quality of justice, that is, 
whether or not a particular jurisdiction is able to provide convenient, 
competent, and fair decision making.37  That many transnational actors 
tend to prefer their own jurisdictions is not surprising when one considers 
                                                 
 32. PARK, supra note 28, at 12. 
 33. BELL, supra note 27, at 13. 
 34. MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd, [1978] A.C. 795, 820 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 35. BELL, supra note 27, at 13-14. 
 36. A.G. Slater, Forum Non Conveniens:  A View from the Shop Floor, 104 L.Q. REV. 
554, 561 (1988). 
 37. BORN, supra note 3, at 3. 
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the degree of lingering uncertainty that a foreign and unfamiliar system 
of law may present.  Certain courts may be more familiar to counsel.  
Cultural differences, alien legal traditions, and even linguistic 
obstructions may create a heightened atmosphere of ambiguity.38  When 
selecting a particular body of law, the jurisdiction’s general reputation as 
a competent legal system is sure to rank as a primary consideration. 
2. Expertise 
 As well, there is the issue of court expertise.  Choice of forum 
clauses offer up an important advantage in terms of giving commercial 
actors the freedom to select jurisdictions that are not only competent, but 
also uniquely qualified to resolve disputes associated with specific areas 
of law.  Parties can select a court with a high degree of commercial 
expertise related to the parties’ particular transaction.39  For instance, the 
“courts of England, Switzerland, New York, and a few other jurisdictions 
are able to resolve complex transnational disputes with a fairly high 
degree of reliability.”40  English law is widely used in the areas of finance 
and commerce.  This expertise will also be embodied in precedent and 
the general honed efficiency of the evolved rules. 
3. Corrupt 
 Many national courts may also suffer from appallingly low 
standards of judicial integrity, the presence of corruption, and so forth.41  
Adding to this, there may be the very real fear that courts are subject to 
possible popular political pressure or other forms of coercion that can 
result in a lack of objectivity, which may sully the courts’ rulings. 
4. Efficiency of Litigation and Quality of Legal Services 
 Beyond this, practical considerations such as the speed of litigation 
and general quality of the legal profession, as well as potential legal costs 
in certain jurisdictions, also help to distinguish one forum from another, 
influencing parties’ selection of venue.42  In the case of arbitration, some 
jurisdictions have at their disposal many facilities to speed the arbitral 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 9. 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id. at 9. 
 41. Id. 
 42. BELL, supra note 27, at 24. 
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process, such as experienced arbitrators, institutions for administering the 
arbitration, hearing rooms, interpreters, reporters, communications, etc.43 
5. Procedural Matters 
 Procedural matters may also be a factor.  For instance, issues such 
as the nature and scope of discovery or disclosure, the rules for allocation 
of the parties’ costs for legal representation, and trial by a lay jury or 
judge recovery of costs, in the right context, may all be decisive 
considerations equal in importance to that of, or perhaps even surpassing, 
more substantive issues of law.44 
6. Preclude Other Jurisdictions 
 Even when a party fails to agree on its preferred forum, it may still 
successfully preclude the selection of a particularly unfavorable 
jurisdiction.45  The party may secure a relatively benign, neutral third state 
jurisdiction with which it is familiar.  For instance, parties from Hong 
Kong and Norway may agree (in the case of arbitration) to dispute 
resolution in London, New York, or Switzerland.  Moreover, this 
agreement may offer a private commercial benefit by avoiding the costs 
of conducting litigation in a distant forum.46 
7. Multiple Litigation 
 The danger of litigation in multiple fora is also prevented by the 
selection of a single venue at the outset of the commercial relationship.47  
The likelihood of overlapping jurisdictions giving rise to parallel court 
proceedings in more than one state is high and represents a distinct 
hazard.  Such litigation may result in “protracted jurisdictional litigation, 
inconsistent (and perhaps unenforceable) judgments, and multiple sets of 
lawyers and legal fees.”48  The importance of choice of forum clauses in 
this aspect cannot be overstated; transnational commercial actors have a 
                                                 
 43. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 9-11 (J. Stewart McClendon 
& Rosabel E. Everard Goodman eds., 1986). 
 44. BORN, supra note 3, at 5. 
 45. Id. at 3. 
 46. David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause:  A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. 
REV. 785, 785 (1993). 
 47. BORN, supra note 3, at 4. 
 48. Id. 
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clear interest in limiting the number of fora where they may potentially 
be drawn into litigation.49 
8. Predictability and Certainty 
 Finally, achieving a measure of accord regarding venue places the 
parties to the contract in a position where they may better assess with 
relative certainty their rights and duties in the event of actual litigation.50  
Forum selection, in this way, provides a degree of predictability to the 
contractual relationship.  The selection of a neutral forum can give 
parties “predictability and certainty about the outcome of the dispute.  
Particularly when coupled with a choice of law agreement, a forum 
selection clause removes uncertainties about jurisdiction, procedural 
rules and other matters.”51  A predetermined forum for dispute resolution 
“helps the parties consider the costs of potential litigation when 
determining their rights and obligations under a contract.”52  There may 
be additional considerations as to costs, because choice of forum clauses 
can “reduce expenses and delay in the litigation, permitting the parties 
more promptly to focus on the merits of the case without expensive 
procedural distractions.”53 
 Several, or in some cases, all of the aforementioned factors work in 
partnership, compelling actors to select a certain jurisdiction over others.  
The majority of these factors are also equally relevant in choice of law 
decisions, and undoubtedly influence parties’ choice of the substantive 
law that will govern their contracts.  Issues related to judicial 
competence, familiarity, expertise (as embodied in precedent), legal 
efficiency, procedural considerations, the preclusion of the law of other 
jurisdictions, and the desire for certainty are also factors in choice of law 
decisions.  Because the selected forum and body of law are typically one 
and the same, the reasons underpinning choice of forum and choice of 
law selections often end up intermeshed.  Although these considerations 
undoubtedly help shape both choice of forum and choice of law 
decisions, and are widely recognized as doing so, the influence of 
network externalities also plays an important role in this process, and 
                                                 
 49. Nicholas S. Shantar, Forum Selection Clauses:  Damages in Lieu of Dismissal?, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 1063, 1080-81 (2002). 
 50. BORN, supra note 3, at 4. 
 51. Igor Volner, Forum Selection Clauses:  Different Regulations from the Perspective of 
Cruise Ship Passengers, 8 EUR. J.L. REFORM 439, 442 (2006). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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thus should not be discounted.  With this in mind, let us now examine the 
extent of this previously unrecognized influence. 
B. So What Exactly Is a Network Effect? 
 Migrating from the domain of economic theory, the notion of 
network externalities,54 or network effect (also called external increasing 
returns), has been put forward as a way of explaining the ascendancy of 
particular products over others.55  It is a useful concept drawn from the 
field of economics that accounts for how certain commercial products 
proliferate in use in a path-dependent manner.56 
 The principle of network effect, or the closely associated concept of 
“bandwagon,”57 is the idea that the implicit value of a certain product 
derived by an agent increases as the number of other agents using the 
same product grows, which in turn draws more users.58  For example, 
your fax machine will increase in value to you as more consumers also 
purchase fax machines.  Obviously, if only you owned a fax machine, its 
utility would be limited to that of a large paperweight.  Thus, “the utility 
that a given user derives from the good depends upon the number of 
                                                 
 54. Network effects are considered network externalities if participants in the market fail 
to internalize these effects.  See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externalities, in 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 671.  However, we 
use both terms here more or less interchangeably, as the points made here should apply to some 
extent to situations even where actors have not internalized the effects.  For our purposes, the 
distinction is not pertinent. 
 55. The phenomenon was observed by early economists such as Alfred Marshall and 
Adam Smith (Smith noted that certain businesses tend to congregate geographically, attracting 
customers to that particular location, which in turn attracts more businesses to move to the 
location).  In the 1980s and 1990s, the idea was reintroduced into mainstream economics by 
scholars such as Arthur, David, and Krugman.  See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND 
PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 6-8 (1994); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of 
QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 335 (1985); PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY:  
ECONOMIC SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 226 (W.W. Norton & 
Co. 1995) (1994). 
 56. For how the concept of network effect has been applied in the literature of path 
dependence, see W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by 
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 116 (1989); W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the 
Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92, 95 (1990) [hereinafter Arthur, Positive Feedbacks]; David, supra 
note 55, at 335; S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 
11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205 (1995). 
 57. The “bandwagon” principle is in fact more accurately understood as one result of 
network effect. 
 58. LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 54, at 671.  See also Katz and Shapiro’s paper on 
network externality in the American Economic Review, in which they define network effect 
thusly:  “There are many products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of 
the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.”  Michael L. Katz & 
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 
424 (1985). 
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other users who are in the same ‘network.’”59  As more users begin to use 
the product and its utility grows, more consumers begin using the 
product, creating a snowball effect as more and more users jump on the 
bandwagon.  Positive feedback mechanisms like bandwagon and network 
effect lie at the heart of path dependency; such mechanisms reinforce 
bourgeoning patterns in a particular field, causing these patterns to 
become progressively more entrenched.  There is a fascinating 
conversation going on in the literature regarding the possible negative 
effects of such phenomenon in terms of natural monopolies and the 
emergence of inefficient standards.  This concept, however, lies just 
slightly outside the scope of the present discussion.60 
 A popular real-world example of network effect is the 
predominance of VHS format over its rival Beta in the early 1980s as 
video recording became popularized.  Some have argued that as more 
consumers bought VHS players, videocassette rental stores, observing 
this trend, stocked up on VHS videocassettes, which in turn caused more 
people to opt for VHS players over Beta, ultimately leading to complete 
vendor lock-in.61  Manufacturers, predicting that VHS would win this 
standardization war, began to produce even more VHS players as a result 
(an example of bandwagon).62  By 1984, VHS videocassettes became the 
standard format for videocassettes, with every manufacturer in the 
industry (with the exception of Sony) adopting the VHS format.63 
 Another oft-cited illustration, first pointed out by David,64 is the use 
of the QWERTY keyboard as a standard layout for keyboards.65  
                                                 
 59. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, at 424. 
 60. Liebowitz and Margolis examine what they call “third degree” path dependency in 
which standards are locked in an inefficient trajectory because participants cannot coordinate and 
switch to more efficient standards en masse.  They conclude that, although rare, third degree path 
dependence has “significant normative policy implications, as it would constitute economic 
inefficiency.”  S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of 
Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 283, 287-89 (1996); see also Arthur, Positive Feedbacks, 
supra note 56, at 99. 
 61. The idea of vendor lock-in, or customer lock-in, also known as proprietary lock-in, 
occurs when a customer becomes dependent on a vendor’s products or services, unable to switch 
to an alternative vendor as a result of high switching costs. 
 62. Liebowitz and Margolis, however, dispute the veracity of this argument (as they also 
do with the QWERTY keyboard example), citing other possible factors that may have led to VHS 
dominance in the market.  Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 60, at 312-16; see also S.J. 
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 21-22 (1990). 
 63. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 60, at 316. 
 64. David, supra note 55, at 332-36. 
 65. Thus termed because the first six letters in the upper left-hand corner of the 
keyboard’s layout are Q-W-E-R-T-Y. 
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Alternative layouts for keyboards are arguably more efficient.66  In fact, 
the QWERTY layout was originally “designed . . . to slow down typing 
speed to prevent the jamming of old-fashioned mechanisms.”67  As more 
typists became trained in typing on the QWERTY design, manufacturers 
increasingly produced the QWERTY keyboard, which in turn 
encouraged more people to learn to type using this particular design of 
keyboard.  The more common the QWERTY keyboard was, the more 
valuable it was to learn to type on keyboards of that design.  And there 
we have network effect, a process that reinforces itself.  The QWERTY 
keyboard is a good example of network effect because for one trained in 
typing on a QWERTY keyboard, the value of the skill, and thus owning a 
QWERTY keyboard, increased in relation to how many QWERTY 
keyboards were in use.  This was due to the value of the “network” of 
such keyboards.  This example is often pointed to as a definitive 
illustration of increasing returns-path dependence.68  Beyond VHS and 
QWERTY keyboards, however, one could find many other real-world 
examples of network effect in the marketplace.69 
C. Synchronization Value and Language 
 Network effect, however, manifests in a more pronounced fashion 
with certain types of products.  This has to do with the nature of the 
product.  The more it depends upon direct interaction with other products 
within a network, or a synchronization with a larger support system, the 
more predisposed it will be to a network effect.70  A certain 
“synchronization value,” as Liebowitz and Margolis call it,71 is the 
essence of network effects.72  Thus, the value of a telephone is more 
directly affected by an increase in users than say a Ferrari.  Of course, as 
more people buy Ferraris, the price of parts and service might decrease 
                                                 
 66. One such model was the Dvorak layout which claimed a forth percent increase in 
typing speed.  Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 60, at 313. 
 67. Id. 
 68. David, supra note 55, at 332. 
 69. Another interesting example of network effect is the competitive pressure Apple 
computers were feeling from the growth of PCs and PC-related computer software and service in 
the 1990s.  This pressure arose from synchronization issues.  See discussion infra Part II.C 
(discussing synchronization).  Because the operating systems of Apple computers were not 
compatible with PC software, this induced a network effect for the larger PC market.  Many 
speculated on whether or not Apple computers would survive.  LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra 
note 54, at 671.  Interestingly, after Apple made its operating systems compatible with PCs, this 
network effect was undercut. 
 70. See discussion infra Part II.D (“Distinguishing Externalities:  Direct and Indirect 
Network Externalities”). 
 71. LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 54, at 671. 
 72. Id. 
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and spur more people in turn to buy Ferraris.  However, a telephone is 
more attuned to the effects of network externalities precisely because its 
value is largely derived from its place within a larger network.  I can 
always go cruising in my Ferrari whether my neighbor has one or not, but 
what am I to do with my telephone if I have no one to call?  If more 
people own telephones, then I have more people I can potentially call.  
The difference between a telephone and a Ferrari is the level of their 
response synchronization values. 
 The classic example of this is language.  Because the purpose of 
language is to facilitate interaction between individuals, a high 
synchronization value lies at its heart.  The linguistic dominance of the 
English language in international business (and the world) over the last 
thirty years can be attributed in large part to a network effect.  As more 
people speak English, the inherent synchronization value of the language 
increases, in turn drawing even more people into the classrooms of ESL 
teachers.  Because the sole purpose of language is to facilitate interaction 
within a larger network of people, the effects of network externalities on 
systems of language are readily discernable.  Like my lonesome 
telephone, what good is fluency in a language if I am the only one who 
speaks it?  Conversely, the value of speaking English grows as the 
number of people with whom one can communicate increases; that is, as 
its inherent synchronization value increases.  This is clear in language.  
Now that the world has in effect tacitly nominated the English language 
as the lingua franca of the modern age, it is becoming progressively more 
unlikely that the entire globe will collectively jump to a new language, 
regardless of possible geopolitical shifts in world power.  As the English 
language grows in popularity, so too does its implicit value, encouraging 
further growth and a continued network effect. 
 Returning to the focus of our discussion, all of this applies in equal 
measure to commercial law.  Like language, its purpose is to facilitate 
interaction within a larger network.  It is no coincidence that Fuller 
suggests that customary law might best be conceptualized as a “language 
of interaction.”73  It is a language of interaction because it is an 
                                                 
 73. Fuller writes: 
I shall argue that the phenomenon called customary law can best be described as a 
language of interaction.  To interact meaningfully men require a social setting in which 
the moves of the participating players will fall generally within some predictable 
pattern.  To engage in effective social behavior men need the support of intermeshing 
anticipations that will let them know what their opposite numbers will do, or that will 
at least enable them to gauge the general scope of the repertory from which responses 
to their actions will be drawn. 
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instrument of communication between people, synchronizing their 
interactions.  Fuller is describing customary law in general, but the 
description applies readily to commercial law and commercial 
interaction. 
D. Distinguishing Externalities:  Direct and Indirect Network 
Externalities 
1. Direct and Indirect Network Externalities 
 Before proceeding, it is important at this point that we draw a clear 
distinction when we speak of network effects.  As previously discussed, 
network externalities may manifest differently.  In explaining what they 
refer to generally as “positive consumption externalities,” Katz and 
Shapiro tender a rather expansive definition, arguing that a network in 
fact embraces many goods beyond physically networked items such as 
telecommunications.74  They argue that positive consumption 
externalities include indirect support networks.75  For instance, “an agent 
purchasing a personal computer will be concerned with the number of 
other agents purchasing similar hardware because the amount and variety 
of software that will be supplied for use with a given computer will be an 
increasing function of the number of hardware units that have been 
sold.”76  They also point out that “[p]ositive consumption externalities 
arise for a durable good when the quality and availability of postpurchase 
service for the good depend on the experience and size of the service 
network, which may in turn vary with the number of units of the good 
that have been sold.”77  They use an example drawn from the American 
automobile market in the twentieth century where “foreign 
manufacturers’ sales initially were retarded by consumers’ awareness of 
                                                                                                                  
LON L. FULLER, Human Interaction in the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER:  SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 213 (1981). 
 74. Katz and Shapiro actually distinguish three kinds of “positive consumption 
externalities”:  direct physically networked items (e.g., telephones), nonphysically connected 
goods (e.g., computer software for computers), and the post-purchase service for a durable good 
(e.g., a luxury car).  Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, at 424.  Lemley and McGowan define these 
three positive consumption externalities respectively as “actual networks,” “virtual networks,” and 
“positive feedback effects.”  Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 488-94. 
 75. In their footnote, Katz and Shapiro also indicate several other subtle positive 
consumption externalities such as:  “(i) the fact that product information is more easily available 
for more popular brands; (ii) the role of market share as a signal of product quality; and 
(iii) purely psychological, bandwagon effects.”  Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, at 424 n.1. 
 76. Id. at 424. 
 77. Id. 
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the less experienced and thinner service networks that existed for new or 
less popular brands.”78 
 For our purposes, however, it is important to understand the slightly 
differing nature of these kinds of network externalities from those driven 
principally by direct interaction.  Liebowitz and Margolis draw such a 
distinction, contrasting the idea of network externalities with what they 
identify as “pecuniary externalities”79 (the effect one person has on 
another).80  They distinguish between network externalities81 that involve 
direct interaction among network participants and those that involve 
“mediation through the market” in the form of decreased costs, etc.82  In 
the literature, this distinction is also defined by the terms “actual 
networks,” “virtual networks,” and “positive feedback effects,”83 or 
alternatively as “direct network effect” and “indirect network effect.”84  
The important difference here is one of direct interaction.  Explaining 
this first class of network externalities, which for purposes of clarity I 
will call direct network externalities (in contrast to indirect network 
externalities),85 Liebowitz and Margolis point out that it occurs “through 
some direct interaction among consumers,”86 and as a result, as the 
network grows it “gains advantages relative to smaller competing 
networks.”87 
 The distinction between direct and indirect network externalities is 
important because with direct networks—systems that rely on network 
externalities arising as a result of direct interaction between network 
participants—the probability that a network effect will take root is far 
greater.  Why is this?  It is simply because the sum value of the system is 
                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. A term borrowed from economics. 
 80. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source 
of Market Failure?, 17 RES. L. & ECON. l, 2 (1995); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 60, at 287. 
 81. The reasons for doing so, however, are because nonpecuniary externalities do not 
involve any inefficiency.  Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 60, at 287. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, at 424; see Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 
488-94.  It is important to note that positive feedback effects are distinct from virtual networks in 
that they involve less direct interaction between users.  See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, at 424. 
 84. Klemperer, supra note 9.
 85. Although Katz and Shapiro (as well as Lemley and McGowan) distinguish three 
general classes, the terms direct and indirect network externalities are used here and throughout 
the discussion because the relevant point at issue is how network externalities are unique in so far 
as the network is based on direct interaction as opposed to an indirect interconnection mediated 
through the market or by other means.  Liebowitz and Margolis rightly point out this distinction, 
and the present discussion takes it as a defining feature of network externalities. 
 86. They also argue that the interaction may occur “through increasing production returns 
of some network-related good.”  Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 60, at 287. 
 87. Id. 
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measured by the extent to which it can facilitate interaction (with our 
example of the telephone, this would be the ability to call people).  Or as 
Lemley and McGowan explain, these are products “whose entire value 
lies in facilitating interactions between a consumer and others who own 
the product.  The benefit to a purchaser, in other words, is access to other 
purchasers.”88  Such products are marked by “the absence of material 
inherent value and the necessity for common standards among goods 
incorporated into the network.”89  Systems exhibiting direct network 
externalities, therefore, are far more sensitive to any increase in the 
network than systems displaying only indirect network externalities, 
whose value may lie in other aspects beyond merely their ability to 
facilitate interaction (recall the example of the lone Ferrari).  Lemley and 
McGowan insightfully point out that this may be conceptualized as a 
continuum of sorts, with “actual networks—in effect communications 
systems—the strongest, and virtual networks—frequently involving 
interfaces between vertically related goods—providing a range of 
examples of differing strength.”90  At the far end of the spectrum, they 
argue, are goods in which the scale of the system itself “rather than 
interactions among users of the good”91 creates the value. 
 While the concept of a continuum is indeed illustrative, Lemley and 
McGowan do not consider that it is also possible for a system to 
simultaneously possess both direct and indirect network externalities.  In 
a sense, the system is on two points along this continuum.  A system of 
this kind, in fact, often provides the most fertile soil in which a network 
effect may grow.  This is, for instance, the case with a telephone, whose 
value will increase primarily from the ability to call more people, but 
also from any corresponding improvement in service (quality, speed, etc.) 
that may result from the increase in users. 
 Arguably, a system that in essence exhibits both direct and indirect 
network externalities is even more inclined to generate a network effect, 
because both classes of network externalities will work towards such an 
end.  The system or item would respond to the network effect arising 
from the indirect interconnection between participants in the network 
mediated through the market, as well as the potentially more powerful 
effects stemming from increased direct interaction amongst agents.  The 
example of a telephone illustrates how a single system may concurrently 
possess network externalities on two different places on Lemley and 
                                                 
 88. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 488. 
 89. Id. at 489. 
 90. Id. at 609. 
 91. Id. 
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McGowan’s continuum, as is also the case for much commercial law, as 
we shall soon see.  It is for this reason that I use the terms direct and 
indirect network externalities (though the distinction might be somewhat 
overly blunt) rather than a continuum to distinguish between these two 
network effects. 
 Systems that, in effect, span this continuum, possessing both direct 
and indirect network externalities, are most likely to produce powerful 
network effects.  This is because, in many cases, the effects of network 
externalities on a system will be offset by other considerations unrelated 
to synchronization value.  These other considerations work against the 
emergence of a network effect.  For instance, to return to the example of 
Beta versus VHS, a user might be reluctant to use VHS because they 
prefer Beta’s shorter tape length, or even because of something as simple 
as a fondness for the one-spool look of a Beta tape.  The indirect network 
externality, in the form of greater availability of VHS tapes, might not be 
enough to persuade our Beta tape devotee to make the switch to VHS.  
The inherent value of a product or switching costs incurred from a 
competing network system may negate the impact of an indirect network 
externality.  Alternatively, to take an example involving solely direct 
network externalities, such as language,92 a speaker might be dissuaded 
from learning a widely spoken language because transaction costs such 
as language lessons or time expenditures may outweigh any potential 
network benefit.  The direct network externality alone might not be 
enough. 
 A system exhibiting direct as well as indirect network externalities 
thus offers a wider entrance through which a network effect may enter, 
superseding other considerations in importance in the eyes of its users.  
Our above example of a telephone network provides both kinds of 
network externalities.  There is a far greater likelihood of enticing users 
away from competing telephone networks if, along with the more 
straightforward benefit of an increase in the size of the network (a direct 
network externality), a telephone network can also offer higher quality of 
service or cheaper prices as a consequence of an increase in users (an 
indirect network externality).  Having, therefore, both direct and indirect 
network externalities will render a system most likely to spawn a network 
effect. 
 In such cases, between these two classes, direct network 
externalities will play the most important and forceful role in producing a 
network effect, while any indirect network externalities that may arise 
                                                 
 92. A language perhaps can be said to possess indirect network externalities as well. 
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will, in a sense, supplement this process.  The telephone is in fact the 
perfect example of this:  because its primary use is in direct 
communication, an increase in the network will have an immediate and 
significant effect on its value, while issues of quality, although taking a 
relative backseat to this principal function, may also contribute to the 
emergence of a network effect.  Thus, our lone direct network externality 
system (viz. language93) would be far more likely to produce a powerful 
network effect than one possessing only indirect network externalities 
(viz. the availability of VHS tapes or repair parts for your Ferrari), a 
system that exhibits both classes of network externalities will be the most 
likely candidate in which to find a strong network effect.  If for some 
reason the direct network externality is not enough, an indirect network 
externality might be adequate to tip the balance and set off a network 
effect.  As we shall see, commercial law is such a system, displaying both 
direct and indirect network externalities.  Possessing both direct and 
indirect network externalities, commercial law is therefore, on a 
fundamental level, better primed to produce a network effect. 
2. Klausner Cites Indirect Network Externalities 
 In his analysis of the effects of network externalities on corporate 
contracts, Klausner (as well as Gillette in his examination of lock-in) 
fails to draw a distinction between classes of network externalities.  The 
network externalities that he cites to make his case, which he terms 
“interpretive network externalities,” “common practice network 
externalities,” “legal services network externalities,” and “marketing 
network externalities,” are in fact all indirect network externalities, in that 
they are not predicated on direct interaction, but rather involve network 
benefits that are “market mediated.”94  As Klausner himself explains, 
“[u]nlike a telephone network . . . a contractual network (like a PC 
network) is linked together by commonly used complementary 
products.”95  Klausner’s entire analysis is limited to network effects of 
only this kind, which is an important point because network effects of 
this nature are arguably not as robust as networks involving direct 
interaction between agents. 
 Klausner’s primary argument—interpretive network externalities—
is based on the notion that the widespread use of a particular contract 
                                                 
 93. Although one could argue that with the example of language we might distinguish 
indirect network externalities, such as the available pool of books, films, and other materials 
available in that language. 
 94. See Klausner, supra note 12, at 759-85. 
 95. Id. at 775. 
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term will generate a greater body of judicial precedent clarifying the 
legal interpretation of the term.  As litigation enhances the term’s clarity, 
Klausner argues, its value increases as the uncertainty that may otherwise 
cloud the term is reduced.  A court’s interpretation of one corporation’s 
contract term, Klausner explains, “in effect embeds that interpretation in 
the contracts of all firms that use the same term.”96  The more firms that 
employ the term, “the more likely it is the term will be litigated, and 
therefore the more likely that future judicial interpretations will be 
provided.”97  The benefit is essentially a reduction in uncertainty.  Parisi 
and Carbonara proffer a similar supposition, arguing that “[w]orking 
within the same legal system increases the frequency and the profitability 
of commercial transactions as it reduces the uncertainty stemming from 
not knowing the legal rules governing the contract.”98 
 To be sure, uncertainty is costly and diminishing it adds to the value 
of a given term.  However, the strength of a network effect arising from 
this may not be all that significant, as this benefit must be weighed 
against the host of other considerations that typically compel a firm to 
adopt a contract term in the first place.  Lemley points out that although 
interpretation through litigation may add some value to open-ended 
contract terms by increasing their clarity, there are fairly strict limits to the 
value of such effects . . . .  [T]he marginal gains in clarity that might be 
obtained through future litigation are [not] high enough to create benefits 
sufficient to lock firms into any particular term. . . .99 
 The benefit of lessening uncertainty is an indirect network 
externality, comparable to an increase in value of one’s Ferrari as repair 
parts become easier to obtain as a result of more people purchasing 
Ferraris.  That is, it does not involve direct interaction between network 
users, but rather it is a benefit conferred indirectly through the network.  
As a consequence, the resulting network effect is comparatively weaker 
than a network effect predicated upon direct interaction. 
 The same holds true for Klausner’s other points.  Klausner argues 
that “the accumulation of business practices implementing the term 
reduces uncertainty, just as the accumulation of precedent does.”100  A 
firm can utilize this base of business practices to inform their choices so 
as to avoid litigation altogether, or failing this, settle disputes more 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 776. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, The Economics of Legal Harmonization 5 
(George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 05-40, 2006). 
 99. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 572. 
 100. Klausner, supra note 12, at 780. 
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efficiently.101  Again, this is an indirect network externality, because the 
benefit accrued does not involve any direct interaction between network 
members. 
 Similarly, Klausner contends that as more firms adopt a specific 
contractual term, legal services able to competently execute the term 
generally increase so that “the legal services available for a commonly 
used term may be superior, either in terms of cost or quality, to those 
provided for a less commonly used term.”102  The benefit here is a greater 
availability of legal support services boasting expertise in the particular 
contract term.  This too, upon analysis, does not entail any direct 
interaction between parties.  The benefit is, instead, conferred through 
the market, much as an increase in computer users spawns a greater 
availability of quality computer service.  The pull of a network effect of 
this nature is thus less powerful.  Lemley and McGowan agree.  Such 
indirect “market mediated” effects, they opine, “are materially weaker 
than direct network effects, or even indirect network effects in the 
presence of actual interoperability, as is the case with computer 
software.”103 
 What Klausner calls marketing network externalities are also 
indirect network externalities.  Klausner argues that firms will be 
reluctant to adopt new terms with which investors may be unfamiliar out 
of fear that the investors will not price the nonstandard term correctly.  In 
this way, the “cost and reliability of analyzing and pricing these terms 
[for the investor] may be affected by their similarity to the terms that 
other firms use.”104  Commonly used terms with which investors are 
acquainted thus offer an implicit value in that they increase the 
marketability of the firm to potential investors.  Although upon initial 
inspection this benefit might appear to involve direct interaction, this too 
is an indirect network externality even though it does seem to touch upon 
a modicum of interaction.  It is an indirect network externality analogous 
to vendors pricing items in a commonly used manner with which 
potential customers are familiar.  For instance, a menu priced in an 
advanced algebraic formula would quite likely impede a restaurant’s 
sales.  Again, the network benefit here is not one based upon direct 
interaction but rather is an indirect advantage derived through an increase 
in the larger network. 
                                                 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 782. 
 103. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 577. 
 104. Klausner, supra note 12, at 785. 
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 Klausner’s analysis of corporate contract terms, though insightful, is 
limited to indirect network externalities, and thus the strength of the 
network effect produced by these externalities will likely be 
comparatively weak where they can be found.105 
3. Delaware Effect 
 Klausner also speculates that network externalities play an 
instrumental role in the apparent predominance of Delaware in the 
market for corporate charters in the United States.106  Upon analysis, 
however, this too is predicated upon indirect network externalities for the 
same reasons as in the case of corporate contracts. 
 Much has been written on the “Delaware effect.”107  In the market 
for corporate charters in the United States, Delaware reigns supreme, 
with over “50% of all public firms . . . incorporated in Delaware, while 
New York, the state with the second highest share, attracts fewer than 5% 
of public firms.”108  Klausner argues that the 
value of a Delaware charter depends in part on interpretive network 
externalities and legal services externalities—the present value of future 
judicial decisions interpreting Delaware law and the net present value of 
legal services applying Delaware law.  Consequently, as the number of 
firms incorporated in a state increases, the value of its charter increases.109 
Daines points out that Delaware is “the only state with a specialized 
Chancery Court for resolving corporate law disputes and its laws are 
relatively certain and well-known.”110 
 While, as in the case of contract terms, these factors may indeed 
yield a network effect, issues of cost, clarity, and quality are indirect 
network externalities that do not rest upon direct interaction between 
                                                 
 105. Id. at 789-814. 
 106. Id. at 843; see also O. Bar-Gill, M. Barzuza & L. Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate 
Law 2 (Harvard Law Sch., Working Paper No. 377, 2005) (“[E]xternalities include the benefits 
that a company may enjoy from having more precedents to rely on and from being subject to rules 
and practices with which capital market participants are well familiar.”). 
 107. The Delaware effect is understood as Delaware corporate law improving firm value 
and facilitating the sale of public firms, and thus the resulting dominance of Delaware corporate 
charters.  See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-31 (1993); 
Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 529 (2001); 
Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004); 
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2001); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited:  
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 942-
94 (1981). 
 108. Daines, supra note 107, at 526. 
 109. Klausner, supra note 12, at 843-44 (footnotes omitted). 
 110. Daines, supra note 107, at 526. 
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agents.  Thus, as with contract terms, the strength of these network 
externalities will likely be obstructed.  Other more substantive issues, 
such as state corporate arrangements that enhance shareholder value, 
takeover rules, a “home-state preference,” the desire of firms to benefit 
from local favoritism, and the higher costs of out-of-state incorporations, 
will inevitably work to offset the impact of such externalities in corporate 
charter decisions.111  The influence of network externalities, even where 
present, is invariably blunted by other important considerations.112  In 
practice, network externalities must often counteract such considerations.  
As discussed earlier, for this reason, networks involving direct network 
externalities are apt to be stronger, while networks that incorporate both 
direct and indirect network externalities will likely generate the most 
powerful network effects. 
E. Motivations for Forum Selection Other than Network Effect Are in 
Fact Network Externalities 
 Now, when we stop and reexamine some of the motivations for 
choice of forum (and choice of law) that we listed at the outset of our 
discussion, we find that the majority of them are network externalities.  
They are in fact indirect network externalities.  For instance, certain 
jurisdictions may enjoy a reputation for competence in dealing with 
certain legal issues.  This may prove to be a primary consideration in law-
selection decisions.  This is in fact a network externality.  A body of law 
that is widely recognized, deeply entrenched, and pervasively utilized 
provides a certain reassurance that, in the case of a dispute, the law will 
                                                 
 111. For a detailed examination of these influences on corporate incorporation selections, 
see Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where To Incorporate, 46 J. L. & ECON. 
383, 397-400 (2003).  Moreover, it should also be noted that other substantive issues, which in 
fact contribute to choosing Delaware incorporation, may wholly eclipse the significance of any 
network externalities and may alternatively account for the dominance of Delaware incorporation.  
For example, Delaware does not “raise its prices to the highest level that companies would likely 
be willing to pay for Delaware incorporation; Delaware’s franchise tax is capped at $150 thousand 
a year even for companies with stock market capitalizations in the dozens of billions of dollars.”  
Bar-Gill, Barzuza & Bebchuk, supra note 106, at 4 (citing Kahan & Kamar, supra note 107, at 
1208, 1253). 
 112. The effect of such indirect network externalities may be quite marginal.  Regarding 
interpretive effects, in the case of opportunity costs of future clarification of governance terms 
and legal service effects, Lemley and McGowan argue that such legal service effects do not create 
significant material efficiencies: 
[T]o the extent laws of other states mimic Delaware’s, the marginal cost of learning 
such laws will be minimal and, given competition among firms and the inframarginal 
nature of such effects, likely be internalized.  The desire to avoid such costs is therefore 
unlikely to play much of a role in maintaining Delaware’s lead. 
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 585 (footnotes omitted). 
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be effectively enforced.  A system of law’s overall sense of legitimacy 
strengthens as its number of “consumers” increases.  As more firms 
select a jurisdiction, the impression of juridical competence and lack of 
corruption is further shored up, in turn encouraging more firms to opt for 
that jurisdiction.  With more use, the legal system indeed gains greater 
legal competence.  In this way, the reputation feeds on itself. 
 Moreover, with widespread use, consumers of law gain a greater 
familiarity with the rules and procedures of that particular jurisdiction, 
providing an additional benefit.  This will feed upon itself in the same 
way; the more frequently a jurisdiction is selected, the more familiar it 
becomes to potential users, eliciting more users to opt for that 
jurisdiction.  A network effect posited upon indirect network externali-
ties—which is a network benefit that does not necessarily provide a 
greater circle of users, but rather provides an improved indirect support 
system—is analogous to smoother roads for one’s Ferrari. 
 This holds true for most of the other points.  Considerations such as 
the speed of litigation and the general quality of legal services are also 
subject to a network effect in this manner.  As a greater number of firms 
and international actors litigate in a particular jurisdiction, the quality and 
costs of legal services in that jurisdiction will invariably be affected, 
providing more opportunities to improve upon their services and gain a 
higher level of expertise.  In the case of arbitration, arbitrators and 
institutions for administering arbitration gain experience with increased 
usage.  A larger legal industry will affect costs, driving down the price of 
quality legal services and their related industries.  This in turn will draw 
more foreign users. 
 Indeed, juridical expertise as whole is subject to a network effect.  
As in the case of legal services in general, with an influx of more foreign 
users courts will gain a greater degree of commercial expertise regarding 
sophisticated commercial issues.  Courts will become uniquely qualified 
to resolve disputes associated with specific areas of law.  London, for 
example, is “known for its particular expertise in certain branches of the 
law such as insurance and shipping.”113  This proficiency will work to 
attract more users, which then contributes to a further increase in court 
expertise.  In the case of London, for instance, commercial actors in the 
insurance and shipping industry will naturally gravitate to the 
jurisdiction, further honing this command over issues involving 
insurance and shipping.  In this sense, juridical expertise is an indirect 
network externality; it provides a network benefit by improving upon the 
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indirect support system, similar to the quality of a telephone connection 
in a telephone network resulting from an increase in users. 
 As for the remaining reasons for forum choices that were cited at 
the outset of the Article, which include the preclusion of other 
jurisdictions, the impetus of multiple litigation, and the assurance of 
predictability, these factors are not network externalities because their 
value does not grow commensurate with an increase in use.  These 
considerations, however, have a relatively neutral effect upon choice of 
forum decisions.  Because all venues can more or less equally provide 
these benefits, they only compel parties to undertake a choice of venue 
decision, rather than influencing the nature of that decision.  Thus, they 
are in this sense not relevant to the present discussion beyond the fact 
that they prompt some choice of forum decision to be made over not 
making one at all. 
 Thus, on closer examination, all of the other factors that emerge in 
law-selection decisions reveal themselves as indirect network 
externalities; they involve, as Liebowitz and Margolis phrase it, a 
“mediation through the market” (rather than some direct interaction 
between consumers).114  Considerations such as competence, familiarity, 
quality and cost of legal services, and court expertise all potentially 
contribute to a network effect.  These considerations attract users, and 
with the subsequent increase in users these elements are thus 
strengthened, which in turn draws in more users.  In this sense, law-
selection decisions are clearly influenced by indirect network 
externalities.  Although these network inducing externalities contribute to 
the overall strength of a network effect, it is the main suggestion of this 
Article that commercial law as a whole, owing to the nature of trade, is 
capable of generating a powerful network effect because it not only 
possesses these indirect network externalities, but also direct network 
externalities.  To reiterate the point made earlier, systems that involve 
both direct and indirect externalities are likely to produce the most 
powerful network effects.  Commerce is such a system.  In what sense 
does commerce also possess direct network externalities?  Let us 
consider this next. 
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III. NETWORK EXTERNALITIES ARISING FROM COMMERCIAL 
RELATIONSHIPS:  THE ROLE OF INTERACTION AND CHOICE 
A. Why Commercial Law Is More Like a Telephone than a Ferrari 
 Returning now to our telephone and Ferrari examples, we can see 
that commercial law is more analogous to a telephone than a Ferrari.  
Like a telephone, commercial law is a tool to assist specific interactions 
between different parties.  And like a telephone or fax machine, its value 
is in its ability to facilitate these direct interactions.  In this respect, 
commercial law also possesses certain implicit direct network 
externalities; for example, commercial interaction is predicated on direct 
interaction between “users.”  When we consider the degree to which 
commercial law arises in response to the demands of the market, similar 
to how any product does, that is, as a tool that serves a useful function in 
that it facilitates direct interactions, the notion that it displays network 
externalities is not altogether surprising.  As we noted previously, the 
number of consumers who recognize the same legal norms is analogous 
to the number of consumers who use a product.  Thus, the adoption of 
legal norms can be compared to the adoption of VHS format over Beta, 
or a consumer bringing home a PC instead of a Macintosh. 
 If we think of commercial law as a product, it is one whose value is 
wholly predicated on its ability to facilitate interaction between parties 
within the larger network in which they operate.  It thus benefits greatly 
from synchronization.  Commercial law, because it regulates an array of 
interactions between changing partners within a larger commercial 
network, is more like a telephone than a Ferrari.  It has an intrinsically 
higher synchronization value and is particularly inclined to generate a 
network effect. 
 Commercial law, as exemplified in the case of choice of law 
situations, possesses not only indirect network externalities, but also 
direct network externalities because its central function is to facilitate 
interaction between parties.  In fact, commercial law is employed 
precisely for that purpose.  Because of the presence of both indirect and 
direct network externalities, commercial law is primed to generate a 
network effect.  The existence of both direct as well as indirect network 
externalities essentially helps offset other factors that may also influence 
a choice of law decision.  Users will inevitably feel the pull of the 
network primarily through the law’s inherent synchronization value, 
reinforced also by considerations that stem from indirect network 
externalities, such as a jurisdiction’s level of expertise, general 
competence, quality and costs of legal profession, and so forth.  
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Combined, these network externalities are apt to trigger a powerful 
network effect that grows more entrenched over time.  At times, for 
certain parties, one or more indirect network externalities may even 
eclipse direct ones in importance.  However, in all situations, there will 
remain the direct network benefit derived from subscribing to a body of 
rules that boasts the largest pool of participants—the benefit to the 
“purchaser” being “access to other purchasers.”115  As with language, the 
value of commercial law increases commensurate with the number of 
people who embrace it.  And as with language, commercial law benefits 
enormously from standardization. 
B. Standardization and Natural Monopolies 
 Like fax machines, telephones, and language, the value of a system 
of law as a standard increases as the number of people who use it grows.  
Like a telephone with no one to call, or a language that no one speaks, 
there is not much good in subscribing to a system of commercial law if it 
is only you who does so.  A strong argument could be made that this 
synchronization value contributed to the spread of the medieval Law 
Merchant in Europe during the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries.  
Having to navigate a diverse assortment of local customs and law, 
medieval merchants were eager to utilize a uniform system of regulation 
to oversee their transactions so as to avoid the commercial inefficiency 
and confusion of dealing with different laws.116  The Law Merchant was a 
tool of unified commercial discourse that transcended the hotchpotch of 
differing local systems of law that traders would encounter, such as 
                                                 
 115. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 12, at 488. 
 116. See TRAKMAN, supra note 22, at 11 (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he Law Merchant itself 
offered the medieval merchant an ideal solution to many of these difficulties [arising from having 
to deal with a diversity of legal norms].  Legal rules were a means towards achieving uniformity 
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ecclesiastical, manorial, or civil.117  The Law Merchant, as a uniform code 
that achieved a measure of standardization of practice in trade, served a 
critical function.  Without recourse to such a uniform code of law, 
merchants would have been faced with a dizzying diversity of local 
customs.  In this way, standardization offered a clear benefit because it 
facilitated their exchanges. 
 The fundamental purpose of standardization is to facilitate 
interaction among individuals by synchronizing their interactions.118  
With telephones, it is having mutually compatible telephones; with VHS 
videocassettes, it is video stores renting VHS tapes that can be played on 
one’s VHS player.  Standardization produces synchronization.  
Synchronization is “the benefit received by users of a standard when they 
interact with other individuals using the same standard.”119  Liebowitz and 
Margolis point out that “synchronization effects will increase with the 
number of people using the same standard.”120 
 Many have concluded that legal standardization must be created 
through the auspices of the state.  Examining standardization in the law, 
Landes and Posner argue that it must be imposed by a central authority.  
They note,
[T]here would appear to be tremendous economies of standardization in 
[law] akin to those that have given us standard dimensions for electrical 
sockets and railroad gauges.  While many industries have achieved 
standardization without monopoly, it is unclear how the requisite 
standardization or commonality could be achieved in the [law] without a 
single source for [law] without, that is to say, a monopoly.121 
Other scholars, however, have concluded that no monopoly is necessary, 
and that standardization may evolve through a decentralized process.122  
The idea of a network effect is thus useful here.  Applied to products in 
the marketplace, network externalities have been used to account for the 
emergence of “natural monopolies” that generate a precise standard.  
These “natural monopolies” can arise from the value of synchronization 
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over production costs (although production costs should also be affected 
as well).123  Applied to law, a network effect offers itself as a more 
comprehensive explanation of how this process may occur in commercial 
law, particularly in a venue such as transnational commercial interaction 
where there is a distinct absence of a central state authority to institute 
standards through regulation.  The reply to Landes and Posner’s 
conclusion, that in order for standardization to occur there must be a 
monopoly, is that network externalities can create “natural monopolies.” 
As with any other product in the market, a natural monopoly may evolve, 
inducing an uncoordinated standardization. 
 Thus, where government is absent, network externalities may step 
in to create spontaneous standardization.  This, however, requires that the 
product (or activity) have synchronization value; that is to say, that it 
directly benefits from an increase in the number of people who use it.  
Commercial law, because it facilitates interaction between individuals, 
has a high synchronization value and thus is particularly open to the 
effects of network externalities. 
C. Switching Costs and Lock-in 
 It is a simple point that the more people who employ a certain 
system of commercial law, the greater its value.  This is so because, just 
as a language facilitates interaction, commercial law’s central function is 
to facilitate commercial interaction.  As merchants engage in commercial 
ventures with different parties, a common language is not only useful, 
but the lack of it may lead to significant financial loss.  Thus, the more 
this language is “spoken,” the more useful it becomes.  This is due in 
large part to switching costs. 
 Switching costs lie at the heart of network externalities.124  After 
early adoption, users may have opportunities to employ alternative 
products; however, due to the transaction costs involved in switching, it is 
more efficient for them to carry on using the product.  In the example of 
the QWERTY keyboard, this would primarily be the inconveniences of 
having to learn to type on a new keyboard and of finding such 
keyboards.  In the example of VHS, this would mean running around 
one’s city in a desperate (and futile) attempt to find a Beta videocassette 
for one’s Beta player.  Potential switching costs, in this way, constrain the 
actions of individuals, corralling them into certain patterns of usage. 
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 Commercial law is no exception to this phenomenon.  Through the 
use of a certain system of law, merchants become increasingly familiar 
with these laws.  In addition, the nature of certain regulations may, at 
times, even dictate and inform the business strategies the merchants 
adopt.  When constructing the terms of their contracts, merchants will be 
cognizant of the fact that law selection decisions “will be relevant in 
determining issues such as the validity of the original agreement and any 
amendments, the interpretation of clauses if there is uncertainty, whether 
there has been a material breach[,] and the calculation of any damages.”125  
Choice of law can have specific commercial repercussions in the case of, 
for instance, warranties and other obligations imposed on sellers of 
goods, as well as in some areas of banking and finance law.126  Choice of 
forum could very well impact the issue of enforcement, which is a 
consideration of tremendous importance to commercial actors.127  In this 
sense then, when crafting the contract, heed must be given to law-
selection considerations, as these choices will largely determine the 
nature of many aspects of the contract should litigation result.  In this 
way, law-selection is an extension of the contract itself; it is an integral 
constituent of the contractual understanding that must ultimately be 
mutually agreed upon by both parties.  In this environment, certain law-
selection choices can quickly emerge as default standards for 
participants.  This is what we see with the prominence of, for instance, 
English commercial law in transnational commerce. 
 Merchants learn to use a law selection as one would learn to use a 
language, and just like learning a language, it entails a certain 
investment.128  If one had to learn a new language with each person with 
whom one interacted, it would be time-consuming to say the least, not to 
mention somewhat confusing and inefficient.  It is more practical to 
simply use one language, ideally the one that most people speak.  
Similarly, it is, broadly speaking, far more “efficient” to simply utilize 
whatever law is used by the majority of individuals with whom one may 
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potentially engage in commercial interactions.129  It is comparatively 
easier, safer, and most likely cheaper to simply continue employing the 
form of law that one has used in the past.  In doing so, one may avoid 
unnecessary switching costs.  This process may take the form of a 
utilization of business usages, rules of arbitration, or, as in the present 
focus of our discussion, even choice of jurisdiction.  As these trade 
practices “crystallize into commercial usages, business patterns 
emerge.”130  These norms proliferate due to network externalities and 
there arises a general reluctance to employ new and not widely used 
jurisdictions. 
 Thus, we see a distinct disinclination on the part of many business 
people to conduct commercial transactions under a law with which they 
are not familiar.  As Wolf points out: 
[T]he prudent tradesman does not enter into a commercial venture if there 
is a possibility of the transaction being subject to the strange laws and 
precepts of a country not in the mainstream of international commerce.  
When faced with the fact of an unfamiliar system of law being applied to 
any transaction, there arises a law-shy reaction.131 
This “law-shyness” is due in large part to prospective switching costs. 
 Moreover, if one learns to utilize a new body of law that few people 
actually use, this would only underscore the wasted expenditure in terms 
of switching costs one has paid.  The “return” on the investment of 
familiarizing oneself with the law, possibly even modifying ways of 
conducting business, would be comparatively smaller if one did not have 
many future occasions to maximize this investment.  Thus, there are 
distinct switching costs that work to reinforce network externalities on 
any given body of commercial law, essentially serving as powerful 
disincentives to switch to alternatives.  In this manner, switching costs 
standardization produces a network effect.  As the number of 
“consumers” goes up, the value of that set of legal norms increases. 
D. How Interaction and Choice Precipitate a Network Effect 
 Returning for a moment to Fuller’s description of customary law as 
a language of interaction:  the metaphor is a good one because law, like 
language, is a tool to regulate human interaction.  The intrinsic value of a 
                                                 
 129. Klausner, supra note 12, at 785.  Assuming of course that the law itself is not terribly 
inefficient or that it represents other significant drawbacks, as discussed above, this would have to 
be weighed against network benefits. 
 130. TRAKMAN, supra note 22, at 99. 
 131. RONALD CHARLES WOLF, TRADE, AID, AND ARBITRATE:  THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
WESTERN LAW 10 (Ashgate Publ’g 2004) (1988). 
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law is contingent upon its relationship to a larger network.132  That is, that 
there is a community of more than one that subscribes to the law.  Like 
language, what good is a system of law if you are the only person who 
adheres to it?  The value of language is derived from its ability to 
coordinate a network of individuals, and as such, like language, it may 
exhibit network externalities. 
 Broadly speaking, this is true of all forms of law.  However, it is 
important to understand that this is especially true for commercial law.  
Why is this?  The answer can be traced back to the elements of fluid 
interaction and frequent choice that commercial law possesses.  If we can 
strain the metaphor of language even further:  commercial law is a 
language that is more widely spoken than its noncommercial counterpart.  
The characteristics of fluid interaction and frequent choice render 
commercial law particularly susceptible to the effects of network 
externalities.  They are, in no uncertain terms, the key ingredients in 
precipitating a robust network effect, and sit at the heart of why law 
constructed around commercial interaction is more inclined to produce a 
network effect than any other context for law.  In situations where there is 
fluid interaction between actors, a network effect may take root because 
there will arise a distinct advantage in standardization.  This fluidity of 
interaction must also be supplemented by frequent choice.  Where the 
actors can choose the standard, parties will tend to opt for the most 
commonly selected one, barring an important reason not to do so.  Thus, 
choice is also an important component.  These two elements—expansive 
interaction and frequent choice—lay the crucial foundations on which a 
network effect may be constructed.  Commercial interaction is uniquely 
imbued with these characteristics.  Let us now examine these two 
elements a little closer, looking at the characteristic of interaction first. 
1. The Element of Interaction:  Commerce Enlarges One’s Circle of 
Potential Partners 
 Before proceeding, however, we should first clarify what was just 
said.  The value of a law for an individual actor is derived from it being 
recognized by a larger group of individuals.  This, however, largely 
depends on whether or not the individual actor has points of interaction 
with the other members in the group.  The greater the scope of 
interaction (or expectancy of interaction), the more susceptible a user 
will be to the influence of network externalities. 
                                                 
 132. Liebowitz and Margolis rightly point out that the fundamental purpose of a standard 
is that it facilitates interaction among individuals.  Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 60, at 292. 
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 Let us illustrate this point with an example.  For instance, I am quite 
content that the Criminal Code of New York State extends to only 
roughly twenty million people.  Whether this number is twenty or 200 
million would only be of direct consequence to me if there were a chance 
I might interact with one or more of the extra 180 million—of course the 
more the better.  To make the same point using the example of the 
telephone, the fact that one can now call more people will mean little if 
one simply does not have more people to call.  If one has no cause to call 
this new influx of telephone users, the resulting increase in 
synchronization value will be irrelevant.  This salient point represents a 
giant “if ” in the center of any network effect argument:  the value of the 
item increases commensurate with the number of people who use it only 
if one has occasion to interact with these new users.133  Synchronization 
value alone is not enough; there must also exist a relatively wide net of 
parties with whom one might at least potentially interact, and the wider 
the better. 
 Commercial interaction clearly provides this element.  Commercial 
activity entails a relatively fluid shifting and broadening of highly 
focused expressions of interaction.  With trade, there is always an 
incentive to “call” new people.  As a consequence, the value of 
commercial law as an instrument to facilitate these interactions increases 
as the number of parties who recognize and employ the law grows—a 
network effect.  This is because those engaged in commerce have a 
uniquely broad pool of potential partners with whom they may embark 
on commercial ventures.  The nature of trade is oriented towards 
enlarging this consortium of partners.  Thus, it is advantageous that more 
and more individuals employ the form of law to which they are 
accustomed.  Equally, for an individual selecting a legal jurisdiction in a 
choice of law clause, from the outset there is an immediate benefit in 
learning to conduct one’s interactions under the system of law that is 
most widely used, thus increasing one’s pool of potential collaborators 
that employ similar law. 
 Compare this with, for example, criminal law where relationships 
are relatively static.  An individual gains no comparative advantage if 
more parties subscribe to the law if the individual simply has no 
occasions to interact with these additional people.  It does not really have 
any impact one way or the other.  After all, what good are other people 
speaking the language that I speak if I never have any occasion to speak 
                                                 
 133. Of course, benefits triggered by indirect network externalities may nevertheless still 
trickle down to a user.  But for reasons we have already discussed, the resulting network effect 
will typically not be as powerful as one arising from both direct and indirect network externalities. 
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with them?134  In the case of family law, for example, how important is it 
to one individual whether people beyond her immediate relations adhere 
to that particular set of regulations?  But the nature of trade is different.  
Commercial activity offers the potential for engaged interactions with 
parties well outside one’s immediate field of interaction, which is the 
opportunity to “speak” with them.  Commercial interaction often 
involves “speaking” with people in very distant places, frequently taking 
a transnational expression. 
a. It Is the Nature of Commerce To Forge New Ties 
 The basic nature of commerce encourages merchants to tirelessly 
expand their circle of associations.  This could be said to be a primary 
objective of trade.  Successful players frequently seek out new partners 
with whom to forge new business relationships in an effort to duplicate 
their prior successes and expand their pool of wealth.  In other forms of 
law, we simply do not find a comparable fluid mixing of specific, 
targeted partners.  This has to do with the fact that commercial law is 
unique in that it requires the seeking out of explicit partners with whom 
to establish definite relationships.  Other forms of law are not as 
concerned with the building of partnerships as they are with preventing 
injurious interactions between individuals in a large group.  Commercial 
law is the active formation of new relationships of cooperation between 
select parties, while noncommercial law involves regulating the behavior 
of individuals through injunctions, that is, what not to do.  The former 
will force a mixing of players by linking together individuals.  This 
places a greater premium on synchronization. 
b. Commercial Relationships Are More Involved 
 While forms of association regulated by noncommercial law are 
generally static, commercial interactions, in contrast, are marked by a 
tendency to build fresh relationships with new partners.  Moreover, these 
commercial relationships tend to be more involved and highly 
specialized, necessitating a more sophisticated utilization of law as an 
instrument to oversee the interaction.  Standardization and 
synchronization are, perhaps because of this, even more of an issue in 
                                                 
 134. There may be some benefits to be garnered from a larger pool of people who speak 
one’s language, even if one does not have occasion to meet with them.  However, at best these 
benefits would spring entirely from indirect network externalities.  For instance, with the example 
of language, a greater availability of literature written in that language would represent one such 
benefit.  While one frequently finds an English version of most appliance directions, Greenlandic 
Norse speakers, or those conversant in only Aramaic, are not as fortunate. 
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this setting.  Although I share a fleeting legal relationship with the man I 
pass on the street in that we both obey the law, mutually refraining from 
inflicting harm on one another (hopefully), we do not construct a 
specialized form of association, and more importantly, I do not actively 
seek out new people to pass on the street.  In this sense, these relation-
ships can be understood as relatively limited and generally static. 
 Commerce, in contrast, is fluid, and anticipates an expansive 
mingling of actors; it is a bridge between particular parties within a 
greater community.  Perhaps it could be conceptualized in this manner:  
while noncommercial law regulates interactions between individuals in 
“a large and at times somewhat unclearly defined community,”135 
commercial interaction is, in effect, the construction of a miniature 
community within that larger community, sometimes involving only two 
parties (if this can rightly be called a community).  It constructs a clear, 
dynamic relationship between them.  This relationship is typically 
marked by forms of complex association, with the law that regulates it 
playing a uniquely important role.  This “bridge” created between one set 
of people can then be extended to another, and so forth.  In each instance, 
a smaller “community” is carved out from the greater whole, the result 
being a greater need for standardization between an ever-widening pool 
of people. 
c. International Pool of Partners 
 This applies equally to entire regions.  Commercial ties often 
transcend geographical boundaries.  In the case of transnational 
commercial relationships, this mixing frequently reaches across the 
threshold of national and cultural borders, as the long arm of commerce 
extends to wherever it can seize hold of a business opportunity and 
flourish.  The nature of modern transnational commercial interaction, in 
some cases, extends the circumference of potential partners virtually 
across the entire globe, in marked contrast with interaction regulated by 
other forms of law, which are implicitly regional and thus ultimately 
limited in terms of the network in which one moves.  Commerce 
intrinsically aspires to enlarge itself.  Commercial interaction is truly 
unique in this respect. 
                                                 
 135. FULLER, supra note 73, at 227. 
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d. Potential Enough 
 Furthermore, this interaction does not necessarily have to even be 
realized in order to give rise to a network externality; merely the potential 
for future interaction with this larger group is enough to increase the 
value of the body of law of a particular jurisdiction.  Potential interaction 
is enough, and most forms of commercial activity carry with them at 
least the potential for a future increase in the circle of actors with whom 
the merchant engages.  In the case of the example of the New York State 
Penal Code cited above, notice that even the remote potential of 
interacting with other people is enough to make it desirable that they too 
subscribe to the same body of criminal law. 
 The truly important role of interaction in generating a network 
effect can be observed in the path-dependent process of railway gauge 
standardization in the nineteenth century.  During this period, railway 
companies who shared a common track gauge could “more easily 
exchange traffic, resulting in lower costs, improved service, and greater 
profits.  As a result, positive ‘network’ externalities . . . produce[d] 
positive feedbacks among choices of gauge by different agents.”136  Thus, 
from an initial hotchpotch of nineteenth-century gauge-width diversity, 
standardization gradually emerged. 
The United States and Canada had six gauges in widespread use until the 
1880s.  Now only a few relic tourist lines use variant gauges.  Britain’s 
extensive Great Western Railway system used a variant gauge for over 50 
years before completing its conversion to the gauge of neighboring systems 
in 1892.  Similarly, the original gauges of The Netherlands, the earlier 
German state of Baden, and much of Norway gave way to the common 
standard that emerged in most of western and central Europe.137 
 At the heart of this evolution was the element of interaction between 
agents, in this case transport between regions.  Spatial isolation often 
impeded the development of standardization, as the absence of 
interaction, or potential interaction, did not provide the necessary 
impetus to adopt widely used standards.  As insulated networks came in 
contact with larger networks, however, this quickly changed.  For 
instance, beginning in the 1830’s, a few short lines in Britain employed 
gauge widths of 5’0” (1524 mm) and 5’6” for what was initially expected 
to be isolated local networks.138  When the expanding and more widely 
                                                 
 136. Douglas J. Puffert, Path Dependence in Spatial Networks:  The Standardization of 
Railway Track Gauge, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 282, 283 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 287. 
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used Stephenson-gauge network reached these lines, they converted 
immediately.139  The variant gauges of Russia and Spain remain precisely 
the same because these historically peripheral economies had relatively 
little exchange of traffic with the rest of Europe.140  In North America, 
interaction likewise played a determinant role.  Between 1866 and 1886, 
railway-gauge standardization emerged largely as a result of the “strong 
growth in demand for interregional transport,” such as the shipment of 
Midwestern grain to seaports along the coast.141  The fact that regions in 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia saw less standardization can be traced 
directly “to lower demand for interregional and international transport.”142 
 Generally, when we speak of network effects, the degree of 
interaction is decisive; the more extensive this interaction is, the greater 
the likelihood that a network effect may emerge, driven by the tangible 
benefits associated with synchronization.  This is true for all kinds of 
network effects.  As Puffert notes, this dynamic applies to “other spatial 
networks—such as for transportation, communication, and electrical 
power distribution—as well as to networks with nonspatial graphical 
structures (patterns of connectedness) . . . .  This arguably includes most 
empirical networks, including the ‘virtual’ networks often considered in 
discussions of network externalities.”143  And more to our point, this 
applies in equal measure to commercial trading networks where there 
exists extensive interaction (or potential interaction) between a great 
many actors.144 
                                                 
 139. Id. 
 140. Puffert goes on to point out that by the time these regions saw higher rail interaction 
with the core of Europe, their common-gauge networks, and potential conversion costs, had 
already grown relatively large, thus offsetting the pull of network externalities.  This process of 
offsetting is particularly relevant to our above discussion of the significance of networks 
involving both direct and indirect network externalities, as other considerations such as 
conversion costs may blunt the effect of network externalities.  Id. at 288; see also supra Part II.D 
(“Distinguishing Externalities:  Direct and Indirect Network Externalities”). 
 141. Puffert, supra note 136, at 289. 
 142. Id. at 291. 
 143. Id. at 312 (footnotes omitted). 
 144. Perhaps the existence of left-hand-drive road systems in some countries can be largely 
attributed to a lack of direct interaction with other networks.  Apart from inter-state trucking, 
there is only limited vehicular interaction among differing systems.  That is, drivers tend to 
remain within their closed network.  The majority of present-day left-hand-drive networks tend to 
be islands (the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Malta, and Sri Lanka), their shorelines providing a natural, nonporous boundary to the network 
that constrains interaction with other networks.  Countries such as India, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Malaysia, and much of South East Africa are exceptions to this, but this may also be due to other 
influences, such as British Colonialism.  Moreover, another factor may be that, unlike railway-
track gauges, left-hand drive does not necessary preclude the use of right-hand-drive vehicles on 
their roads.  Over the course of the twentieth century, there occurred a gradual worldwide shift 
from left-hand drive to right-hand drive.  A commonly cited reason for this switch is conformity 
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 By creating an enterprise that, in effect, draws from a vast pool of 
possible partners, commerce creates a situation where the more people 
who speak the same legal language the better.  The key point is that 
commerce creates a state of affairs in which actors essentially participate 
in a much wider community of potential partners—in fact, usually the 
bigger the better.  This wide network of interaction is fluid and shifting, 
providing a high degree of mixing between actors.  Commercial 
partnership is a bridge between disparate parties that, in effect, widens 
the scope of one’s prospective interactions well beyond one’s immediate 
circle of would-be partners.  As it does so, it cries out for the use of a 
common language of legal norms.  To strain our language metaphor 
perhaps to the point of utter collapse:  while noncommercial law, being 
more static in its sphere of potential coactors, can be compared to the 
language you speak with your immediate family, commercial law might 
be a language you might speak with your entire street, your city, country, 
perhaps even an industrial village in central China, and as such, you had 
better pick a language that is widely spoken.  Commerce’s element of 
fluid interaction provides the first key element in generating a network 
effect.  The second decisive component is the ability of actors to select 
the law that oversees their interactions.  Let us now turn and examine this 
second component. 
2. The Element of Choice:  Parties Selecting Law with Each New 
Interaction Are Consumers Purchasing a Product 
 The ability for commercial actors to, in effect, choose the applicable 
law contributes to commercial relationships being especially receptive to 
network externalities.  In many respects, a contract allows parties to 
select the law they wish to use.  For the most part, this is simply not the 
case with other forms of law.  Transnational commercial exchange in and 
of itself often represents an opportunity for the participants to select and, 
to some extent, even construct specific rules to govern their exchange.145  
This characteristic anticipates a network effect by allowing the 
“consumers” of legal norms to essentially select elements of the law, or 
entire jurisdictions of law, in a manner comparable to a consumer 
                                                                                                                  
with neighboring transportation networks, because it increases the safety of cross-border traffic.  
For example, former African British colonies such as Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Ghana 
have all converted to right-hand drive because they all share borders with former French colonies 
utilizing right-hand systems.  The former Portuguese colony of Mozambique retained a left-hand 
system despite the fact that its colonial ruler converted to right-hand drive in the early part of the 
twentieth century.  Interestingly, all Mozambique’s bordering countries are also left-hand drive. 
 145. See Benson, supra note 22, at 659. 
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purchasing a product.  Without this ability to choose, a network effect 
could not take root because users’ tendencies would not find expression.  
The ability to choose the relevant law to govern their interaction gives 
parties the freedom to follow the lead of previous parties, and, so to 
speak, jump on the legal bandwagon, precipitating a network effect.  The 
predominance of English contract law as a standard for transnational 
commercial ventures attests to the reality of this effect. 
 This is, perhaps, nowhere more evident than in the consent to 
jurisdiction and forum selection clauses of transnational commercial 
agreements, in which entire systems of law may be selected over others.  
This choice opens the door to a network effect for reasons already 
mentioned.  Like consumers choosing one product over another, 
consumers of law face a similar choice.  This is equally true for choice-
of-dispute arbitration procedures and the various other elements of their 
contracts.  To be sure, a “mini-legislature” convenes each time a new 
commercial partnership is formed, invariably promoting the use of 
certain legal norms over others, and in the case of law-selection 
decisions, certain jurisdictions over others. 
 An important point that should be emphasized here is frequency of 
choice.  The more frequently parties have the opportunity to opt for one 
jurisdiction over another, the more responsive these selections will be to 
general trends in “consumer” tastes.  Each new point of contractual 
interaction allows for new user input, providing an opening through 
which network-related considerations may enter.  Upon the initiation of 
new partnerships, merchants engaging one another in trade can elect a 
specific system of law to oversee their subsequent interactions.  These 
instances are recurrent points at which the user may reevaluate the 
benefits derived from utilizing a particular body of law, and potentially 
switch.  Without such instances, it would be exceedingly difficult for a 
network effect to take root. 
 For instance, users of cellular telephone networks that offer free 
calling between users would be more susceptible to the influence of a 
network effect that would follow from large competing telephone 
networks if these users were purchasing a new telephone every month.  
Users would have more opportunities to subscribe to a network with 
more users.  Trends in the number of network users would, in this 
manner, translate into a network effect far more swiftly.  In this sense, 
frequent choice helps pave the way for a network effect.  The repeated 
formation of new commercial partnerships, as evident in the case of 
merchants, provides exactly this, where at the outset parties essentially 
choose the relevant law by crafting contractual terms, adopting 
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preexisting ones, and more to the point at issue here, by inserting choice 
of forum and choice of law clauses into their contractual agreements.146 
 The ability for parties to decide on law with each new interaction 
allows for a network effect to take place because there are countless 
windows through which participants can express their preferences for 
specific rules over others.  A general shift toward a particular body of law 
may incrementally emerge, experiencing an increasing return as more 
merchants, influenced by the effects of network externalities, gravitate 
toward it.  In this manner, partly as a result of frequent choice, a sort of 
natural legal monopoly may emerge, its predominance as a legal standard 
becoming ever more deeply entrenched over time. 
 This is not the case with other forms of law precisely because those 
structures preclude the possibility of incremental feedback.  In the case 
of criminal law, for instance, two strangers meeting one another certainly 
do not negotiate and decide on which elements of the penal code will 
apply to their present interaction, or even more absurdly, which nation’s 
criminal law will govern their relationship.147  Commercial law, 
specifically transnational commercial law, is unique in respect to the 
degree to which the actors select the law.  Indeed, this is analogous to 
consumers frequently purchasing products. 
 While commercial law is, in this sense, more fluid and dynamic, 
other forms of law cannot shift as seamlessly or in such direct response 
to the inclinations of “consumers.” Thus this limits the emergence of a 
network effect on such systems.  While the common law, in its reliance 
on judge-made law, does allow for greater responsiveness when 
contrasted with statute-based systems of law, this is nowhere near as 
                                                 
 146. At the same time, the extent to which parties are free to make any law-selection 
choice should not be exaggerated.  In the case of choice of forum there are definite restrictions on 
the freedom to choose one jurisdiction over another.  In the case of choice of law provisions, the 
ability to select proper law is limited by the nature of the jurisdiction one finds oneself in.  For 
instance, 
Some systems adopt a fairly open policy, allowing parties to choose foreign law, 
subject to the substantive screening discussed above.  Others further restrict adoption of 
foreign legal regimes when the chosen legal system has a substantial relationship with 
the case.  This [type of] regime operates through a ‘substantial relationship test,’ 
requiring the chosen legal system to have a relevant connection to the contracting 
parties or to their legal relationship.  Such ‘substantial relationship’ requirements 
generally grant much discretion to the courts in validating the contractual choice of law. 
This regime is applied in the United States.
Carbonara & Parisi, supra note 98, at 6. 
 147. This is not to discount, of course, situations in which criminals may select a national 
forum for their crimes, taking into consideration the potential legal consequences should their 
crime be exposed in that jurisdiction. 
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finely tuned and sensitive as the law that emerges as the direct product of 
contracting parties.  The net effect of this sensitivity is that network 
externalities can influence the growth of commercial law in a manifest 
fashion, while its noncommercial brother is more resistant to the self-
propagating influences of a network effect.  In this sense, frequent choice 
works together with commerce’s characteristic of fluid interaction to 
yield a direct network externality within commercial law, one predicated 
on direct interaction between participants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Now, let us reevaluate our initial supposition:  commercial parties 
selecting law can be likened to consumers selecting a product, and are 
thus equally susceptible to the effects of network externalities.  They are 
“consuming” a legal jurisdiction.  The number of “consumers” who 
subscribe to the same legal norms is analogous to the number of 
consumers who use a product.  As the number of “consumers” increases, 
so too does the inherent value of selecting that jurisdiction, inducing even 
more people to “purchase” that body of law.  This is a network effect.  
Transnational commercial law is ideally calibrated so as to produce a 
network effect.  This stems from the inherent nature of commerce.  The 
purpose of this discussion was to explain how this is so.  I posited a 
distinction between two kinds of externalities, direct and indirect network 
externalities, concluding that network systems with both kinds of 
network externalities were the best candidates to produce a robust 
network effect.  I showed that many of the factors to which selection of 
forum and choice of law are commonly attributed, such as a jurisdiction’s 
competence, the quality of legal services, and court expertise, are in fact 
indirect network externalities.  More crucially, however, commercial law 
also demonstrates an implicit direct network externality in that its 
fundamental purpose is to facilitate direct interaction between network 
participants.  Thus, because commercial interaction exhibits direct as 
well as indirect network externalities, it is primed to trigger a network 
effect, as these two tiers will tend to offset other factors that may be 
involved in law-selection decisions.  If the pull of a direct network 
externality is not enough, indirect network externalities may be adequate 
to tip the scales and trigger a network effect.  To be sure, indirect network 
externalities such as a jurisdiction’s competence, the quality of legal 
services, and court expertise, will often factor more prominently into 
law-selection choices; however, direct network externalities will 
invariably help shape these decisions. 
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 We then discussed how the twin ingredients of fluid interaction and 
the frequent choice present in commerce precipitate a network effect.  
Expansive interaction between network actors (or even potential 
interaction) opens the door to a network effect by placing a higher 
premium on the need for synchronization.  The deeply involved nature of 
commerce is to forge new ties between disparate parties, in effect 
widening the pool of potential partners for commercial actors, often 
across the threshold of national borders.  Trade, in a sense, essentially 
fashions a larger community within which participants may then interact.  
We then looked at how frequent opportunities to select law, as illustrated 
in law-selection provisions embedded in the contracts of fresh 
commercial relationships, allow for an incremental drift towards a 
specific jurisdiction because each successive contract represents a 
juncture where commercial actors may opt for an emerging standard and, 
in doing so, further contribute to its emergence.  This frequency of choice 
opens the door to a network effect.  Without these occasions for 
“consumer” feedback it would be difficult, if not virtually impossible, for 
a network effect to take root. 
 The characteristics of expansive interaction and choice, in 
conjunction with both direct and indirect network externalities, represent 
the crucial building blocks of a network effect.  Commercial interaction 
has this characteristic in spades.  What is more, the influence of network 
externalities is only magnified by the undercurrent of brute competition 
and the verity of the bottom line that propels commercial enterprise, 
forcing players to make choices that promise to be most economically 
advantageous.  Unlike consumers buying Beta over VHS, commercial 
entities typically do not have the luxury of preference over expedience.  
To be sure, when contracting parties face new law-selection decisions 
when drawing up their contracts, a jurisdiction that has already emerged 
in their relevant industry as a standard will commonly be invoked 
precisely because it is the standard, thus inducing a network effect.  In the 
case of sophisticated transnational parties to a contract, when proper 
attention is paid to their law-selection choices, network externalities 
inevitably present themselves in some form or another.  Any system, 
then, that possesses both direct and indirect network externalities and 
exhibits a high degree of choice and interaction between participants is 
ideally calibrated to generate a network effect.  Because commerce so 
clearly possesses these characteristics, one should not be surprised to 
discover the conspicuous pull of a network effect on choice of forum and 
choice of law decisions or on the adoption of commercial norms in 
general.  These ideas may be readily applied to the spread of legal norms, 
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business usages, standard terms of contract, and much else of the modern 
law merchant.  With the current move towards arbitration in international 
commerce, where arbitrators in burgeoning global arbitration centers 
employ an overlay of transnational law, these same principles will 
operate, ever-deepening the entrenchment of certain bodies of law or sets 
of legal norms as recognized standards. 
